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1 Introduction
A large literature in economics and political science has investigated the effect of natural
resources on political and economic development (Sachs and Warner, 1995, 2001; Mehlum et
al., 2006a,b; Haber and Menaldo, 2011). These studies have delivered rather mixed results,
and a general consensus has not emerged on whether, ultimately, resource abundance should
be viewed as a “blessing” or as a “curse”.1 But which factors explain why the discovery of
valuable resources leads to desirable outcomes in some countries (e.g. Norway, Australia) and
deleterious ones in others (e.g. Nigeria, Zimbabwe)? The quality of pre-existing political and
legal institutions is arguably important: when institutions are dysfunctional, conflict over
access to resource rents is likely to escalate, giving rise to increased corruption, rent-seeking,
and even violence (Skaperdas, 2002; Collier and Hoeﬄer, 2002). Similarly, the literature
on organized crime (Gambetta, 1993; Konrad and Skaperdas, 2012) has argued that the
combination of weak institutions and resource abundance can be conducive to the emergence
of mafia-type organizations which can have profound and long-lasting effect on a country’s
economic prospects.
The profound socio-economic consequences of organized crime has been a subject of grow-
ing interest among academics and policy-makers alike (Jennings, 1984; Fiorentini and Peltz-
man, 1997; Skaperdas, 2001). Research on the topic has focused, in particular, on the study
of mafia-type organizations operating in various parts of the world.2 While these contribu-
tions have expanded our knowledge of the nature and structure of such organizations, their
economic origins remain largely unexplored.
Our paper attempts to fill this gap advancing the hypothesis that mafias - which following
Gambetta (1993) we conceptualize as providers of private protection - emerge to protect valu-
able natural resources when public law-enforcement institutions are weak or absent. While
this argument is applicable to a broad range of examples, our empirical analysis focuses on
the particular case of the Sicilian mafia, the oldest and most notorious example of this sort
of organizations which dates back to the XIX century and which has had a considerable and
long-lasting effect on Sicily’s socio-economic development.3 More specifically, we argue that
the Sicilian mafia emerged after the demise of feudalism and the collapse of the Bourbon
Kingdom in a context characterized by a severe lack of state property-right enforcement in
response to the rising demand for the protection of sulfur - one of Sicily’s most valuable ex-
port commodity - whose demand in the international markets was soaring at the time. Such
positive shock to the value of sulfur protection favored Mafia’s emergence in areas endowed
with sulfur reserves, naturally more prone to its production and commercialization.
To test this hypothesis we employ a comprehensive dataset which combines various mea-
sures of early mafia’s diffusion across Sicilian municipalities with detailed information on
natural resource endowments and a range of other geographical characteristics. Our identifi-
cation strategy exploits exogenous differences in the geographic distribution of sulfur reserves,
which exposed ex-ante similar Sicilian municipalities to an asymmetric shock to the value of
protection, which lasted for most of the XIX century.
1See Frankel (2010) for a comprehensive survey on the topic.
2Relevant contributions on mafia-type organizations by sociologists include Gambetta’s seminal work on
the Sicilian mafia (1993), Varese’s studies of the Russian mafia (2005), and of the Japanese Yacuza. Recent
contributions by economists have looked the economic impact of the Sicilian mafia (Pinotti, 2011) and the
workings of criminal networks in the context of the American mafia (Mastrobuoni and Patacchini, 2011).
3Lupo (1993) and Dickie (2004) provide an excellent account of the history of the Sicilian mafia and of its
expansion to other regions of Italy and to the United States.
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While documenting the magnitude of the shock and defending the exogeneity of its dis-
tribution is relatively straightforward, establishing that municipalities that experienced such
a shock were ex-ante similar to those that did not is a more demanding task. One crucial dif-
ficulty lies in excluding that differences in the availability of natural resources are correlated
to differences in other dimensions (e.g. institutional quality), which may affect mafia’s emer-
gence through other channels. To address this concern, we pursue several strategies. First,
we document that differences in sulfur reserves are not correlated with population growth
rates in previous centuries. Since in the context of a Malthusian regime population represents
a good indicator of the degree of economic development, this is indicative of the fact that
sulfur played no special economic role prior to the XIX century. Second, in our economet-
ric analysis we control for a wide range of observables that are likely to be correlated with
institutional quality, economic activity and geographic and demographic differences. Third,
in all our specifications we include area fixed effects, which allows us to identify our main
effect from variations in sulfur endowment within small areas, which are plausibly homoge-
neous along several non-observable dimensions. Finally, following Acemoglu et al. (2012), we
perform additional tests of our hypothesis based on the comparison of pairs of neighboring
municipalities with different sulfur endowment. Furthermore, to account for possible spatial
correlation in mafia’s emergence, we replicate our analysis using spatial regression methods.4
Our empirical findings provide strong support for our main hypothesis. In particular, we
find that sulfur availability has a positive large and significant effect on early incidence of mafia
activities. Our findings are robust to the use of different measures of early mafia incidence,
to the introduction of a number of geographical and socio-economic controls, and to the
use of the complementary approaches discussed above. We also discuss and test alternative
explanations of the emergence of the Sicilian mafia proposed in the literature - such as the
key role played by citrus production - which, however, do not appear to find support in the
data. Although the focus of our analysis is on the emergence of the mafia, in the last part
of the paper we also document the existence of a strong correlation between historical and
current presence of the mafia, and discuss the possibility of using sulfur availability as an
instrument for the latter.
Although specific to the case of the Sicilian mafia, we believe that our findings can be
helpful to inform our understanding of the rise of mafia-type organizations in various different
parts of the world, where similar economic and institutional conditions may have occurred.5”
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates our theoretical
framework and relates our work to the literature on mafia-type organizations and resource
curse. In section 3 we discuss the socio-economic and political conditions of XIX century
Sicily that favored the emergence of the mafia, with particular regard for the collapse of the
Bourbon regime and the upsurge in sulfur’s value. In section 4 we present the data used in
the empirical analysis, while in section 5 we describe our empirical strategy and discuss our
findings. Section 6 concludes.
4Acemoglu et al. (2012) employ this strategy to estimate the effect of gold-mines-related slavery in Colom-
bia. One advantage of our application is that we do not have to worry about the endogeneity of slavery, since
we are directly interested in the effect of natural resources.
5It is the case, for example, of Yakuza in Japan, the Triad in Hong Kong and the Russian mafia. Indeed,
Yakuza had its origins after the demise of the feudal system in Japan, while the Russian mafia after the
dissolution of the USSR.
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2 On mafia and resource curse
Various theoretical approaches have been proposed in the literature to study the structure
and functioning of mafia-type organizations (see Fiorentini and Peltzman, 1997 and Anderson
and Bandiera, 2005 among others). It is hence important to immediately clarify what is the
working definition of mafia we refer to. Following Gambetta’s seminal contribution (1993),
we conceptualize the mafia as an industry for private protection; in this framework the
equilibrium level of mafia’s activity is determined by the interaction between demand and
supply of protection services by private providers since public provision is lacking or greatly
ineffective.
Our research relates to the vast literature on the socio-political impact of natural re-
sources. This literature has discussed various mechanisms through which resource abundance
may ultimately be regarded as a “curse”: vast resources may fuel violence, theft and looting
(Skaperdas, 2002), they may be used to finance rebel groups, warlords or civil wars (Collier
and Hoeﬄer, 2002), or may favor the emergence of criminal organizations aiming to extract
part of the wealth derived from their exploitation. Although some evidence suggests that
resource-rich countries display worse economic performance than resource-poor ones (Sachs
and Warner, 1995, 2001), no unanimous consensus on this matter has emerged (see for exam-
ple Haber and Menaldo, 2011). In fact, as some observers have pointed out, whether natural
resources may result in a “curse” or a “blessing” may crucially depend on a country’s institu-
tional quality (Mehlum et al., 2006a,b).6 In the presence of weak institutions, our argument
goes, natural resources are particularly vulnerable to predatory attacks; in this context, the
(illegal) use of violence provides mafia-type criminal organizations with a competitive ad-
vantage in the supply of protection and extortion (Gambetta, 1993; Konrad and Skaperdas,
2012), resulting in the capacity to extract a substantial portion of natural-resource-based
rents.
This research integrates two previous econometric studies that have looked at the histori-
cal emergence of the Sicilian mafia. The first one, by Bandiera (2003), uses a common agency
model to formalize the idea that the mafia should have been historically more active in towns
were land was more fragmented,7 and finds support for this hypothesis using qualitative data
from the 1885 parliamentary survey (Damiani, 1885) on 70 districts (mandamenti) in western
Sicily. 8 The second one, by Pazzona (2010), expands Bandiera’s sample to 160 observations,
documenting that the mafia was more likely to emerge where the competition by new so-
cial actors was harsher, particularly in areas where land value was higher and land holdings
larger, at the opposite of what Bandiera (2003) finds. We improve upon these contributions
by expanding the scope of the analysis to a much larger and more detailed set of geographical
units covering the entire island; this allows us to investigate the large differences in the inci-
dence of the mafia across Sicilian areas, which is considered one of the most puzzling question
about the history of the Sicilian mafia.9
6Institutional quality may, in turn, depends on features as diverse as geographic isolation, ethnic divisions,
or state collapse (Skaperdas, 2011).
7The argument is based on the idea that the purchase of protection from a single landowner imposes a
negative externality on the other ones (since it deflects thieves on their properties), and that, hence, landlords
will be competing with each other to acquire protection and to exclude others from it. By increasing the
number of competing landlords, land fragmentation should increase mafia’s potential profits.
8We present and discuss in detail in the data section the parliamentary survey employed by Bandiera (2003)
and the administrative jurisdictions in XIX century Sicily.
9This aspect has been discussed by historians, sociologists and economists alike. Some examples include
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Following the first version of this paper, two independent contributions have explored
alternative explanations for the mergence of the Sicilian mafia. While Dimico et al. (2012)
propose an argument similar to ours but centered around the historical role of citrus fruits,
Del Monte and Pennacchio (2012) investigate the relationship between organized crime and
brigandage. In our empirical section we test the robustness of our results to these alternative
explanations and discuss some important data and methodological issues which, in our view,
raise concern over the solidity of these studies’ respective findings.
More in general, the results of this research complement the literature on the emergence of
persistent social institutions as the consequence of what can be viewed as ‘historical accident’
(Acemoglu et al. (2001)), which in the context our our study, would be represented by the
sudden rise in international demand for Sicilian sulfur. Although geographical characteristics
per se are not the focus of our study, the findings we present can also be interpreted in the
context of the debate on the long-term impact of geography on socio-economic development.
Previous research has documented that the environment can influence economic performance
directly, through its effect on health and agricultural productivity (Landes (1998); Sachs
and Malaney (2002)), and indirectly, by setting the conditions in which social norms and
political institutions have formed (Sokoloff and Engerman (2000); Easterly and Levine (2003);
Durante (2009); Nunn and Puga (2012) and Michalopoulos et al. (2010)) or by defining
environmental constraints to population growth (Galor and Weil (2000)). The evidence
presented here suggests that, under given economic circumstances, geographic characteristics
may have contributed to the emergence of particular forms of social organizations (criminal
ones in this case), which have persisted over time and continue to have relevant socio-economic
effects.
3 Historical background
XIX century Sicily presented the two conditions that, according to the “resource curse” argu-
ment discussed above, are conducive to mafia’s emergence: poor quality of law-enforcement
institutions and soaring value of domestic natural resources. In what follows we discuss some
aspects of the XIX century Sicily political and socio-economic context that are relevant to our
analysis, with particular regard to the main sources of institutional weakness, and the impact
of growing international demand for Sicily’s high-value mining and agricultural production.
3.1 Institutional weakness and economic development
Two major political transformations characterized the history of Sicily during the XIX cen-
tury: the demise of feudalism in 1812, and the collapse of the Bourbon’s domination in 1861.
Both these events contributed to the disruption of Sicilian law enforcement institutions and
the deterioration of property-rights security.
Feudal barons had long been struggling with the monarchy, which imposed on them a
heavy fiscal burden, and this struggle intensified when, in 1806, in an attempt to escape from
the French, the Bourbons moved from Naples to Palermo, Sicily’s capital. At the beginning
of the XIX century most of Sicilian municipalities were under barons’ direct jurisdiction;
however, most feudal lords did not reside in their lands but in Palermo, the center of the
Lupo (1993); Gambetta (1993) and Sylos Labini (2003).
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island’s political, economic and social life.10 Their lands, together with their feudal rights,
were generally rented out to local administrators (gabelloti), who were in charge of managing
the landholding’s productive activities and who invested their own capital in it. The abo-
lition of feudalism represented a profound institutional change, which officially transferred
all feudal jurisdictions to the State. Yet, while barons’ control over their lands had been
weakened, limits to the power of the monarch had also been imposed by the establishment of
a parliamentary system that assigned to the Parliament - largely dominated by the barons
- extensive powers of control over the King’s acts (Candeloro, 1956). The power struggle
between landlords and the Bourbons continued until 1861, when the kingdom collapsed and
its territories were annexed to the newly formed Italian State. This institutional struggle
resulted in extremely low levels of law enforcement, a situation which did not improve under
the unified State.
The feudal economy was primarily agrarian, based on extensive cultivations (mainly cere-
als) and characterized by very low productivity and peasants’s extreme poverty. The abolition
of feudalism had little de facto impact on land distribution and did not result in increased
productivity (Blok, 1966, 1969). The most valuable productions were particularly exposed
to predatory attacks from local bandits (briganti), and the lack of law enforcement by the
State triggered the demand for private forms of protection. Where this demand emerged, the
supply of individuals specialized in the use of violence was abundant, and information about
potential customers as well as suppliers’ reputation flew quickly. In the countryside, gabelloti
were surrounded by a number of guards, former soldiers and former convicts, all trained in
the use of violence, who, formerly employed by feudal lords, were now looking for new job
opportunities. Local networks of such individuals quickly emerged: extremely well informed
about the local context - about potential victims of violent predation and potential perpetra-
tors alike - they were in the position to establish a credible reputation as effective protectors.
In the words of Franchetti (1876), this process led to a “democratization of violence”. As the
violent threats used to protect their “clients” could also be used to intimidate them, early
mafiosi were in a position to create their own demand; as a consequence, the distinction
between supply of protection and threat of extortion was generally unclear. Indeed, various
forms of agreements linked briganti and mafiosi, as the latter used the threat of the former
to justify the services they offered.11
3.2 Sulfur
The case of the sulfur industry represents one of the clearest examples of how, in the absence
of effective public law-enforcement institutions, a florid market for private protection emerged.
Sulfur mines were rented out and, not unusually, the right to exploit them had to be defended
from violent attacks. Furthermore, once extracted, sulfur minerals - largely produced for
export purposes - had to be transported to Palermo or other ports, so cargoes’ safety along the
way had to be ensured as well. Starting in the first decades of the XIX century, international
demand for sulfur soared, as this represented a fundamental intermediary input for industrial
10The port of Palermo was by far the more trafficked in the Island. In 1838, on a total of 480 Sicilian
merchant vessels that left for foreign ports, 240 were from Palermo, while only 65 from Messina, the second
port in order of importance (Petino, 1958).
11Moreover, private protection exerts negative externalities on those who are not protected, since it deflects
the threats toward them, as in Bandiera (2003). This is another way in which supply creates its own demand.
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and chemical productions, which were quickly expanding both in Britain and France.12 For
all of the XIX century and during the first decade of the XX century, Sicily represented the
world’s largest sulfur producer, accounting for up to 83% of world sulfur production in 1893.13
The increase in international demand for sulfur determined an increase in the value of its
protection favoring mafia’s emergence. To identify this effect, our empirical analysis exploits
exogenous variations in the availability of sulfur across Sicilian municipalities. It is worth to
stress that Sicilian sulfur was mainly superficial (Squarzina, 1963; Cancila, 1995) and hence
no considerable investments were required to find and extract it, so the information on the
presence of sulfur mines proxies very well the presence of sulfur itself. Key to our identification
strategy is the assumption that the presence of sulfur reserves was unimportant for local
economic activity prior to the XIX century. Available evidence on Sicily’s sulfur export is
consistent with this view: as shown in figure 1 Sicilian sulfur exports, virtually negligible at
the beginning of the XIX century, exceeded 500 thousands tons by the beginning of the XX,
accounting for about 6% of Sicilian GDP. Export growth was especially marked during the
years comprised between the 1830s and the 1850s when it reached an astonishing 9% annual
rate.14 All these factors contributed to increase sulfur producers’ demand for protection both
around the mines and along the routes connecting these to the main ports.
Not surprisingly, the Brotherhood of Favara, the first documented mafia-type criminal
organization, was discovered in 1883 in the heart of sulfur-producing Sicily (see Dickie, 2004).
The discovery of this organization led to the arrest of more than 200 affiliated (on a total of
more than 500 arrested), 107 of whom were convicted in the following trial. Of these 107, 72
were workers, at different layers, of the sulfur industry, coming from two rival factions, which
found in the Brotherhood a way to achieve power in the market of protection in the context
of sulfur extraction.
It is important to mention that the export of Sicilian sulfur rapidly declined over the
first part of the XX century; this was mainly due to the development of new extraction
technologies which made it cheaper to exploit previously untapped deep reserves in other
parts of the world, thus reducing the comparative advantage of Sicilian superficial sulfur
mines.
3.3 Citrus fruits
Some historians and commentators have advanced the hypothesis that the development of
the citrus industry - which also took place in the XIX century - also played an important role
in favoring the emergence of the Sicilian mafia, especially in the area around Palermo. As
Dickie (2004) points out: “In 1834, over 400,000 cases of lemons were exported. By 1850, it
was 750,000. In the mid-1880s an astonishing 2.5 million cases of Italian citrus fruit arrived
in New York every year, most of them from Palermo”. Indeed, the evolution of international
demand for citrus fruits resembles that of sulfur, although the time pattern for citrus is less
12In 1855 over 70% of Sicilian sulfur was exported to France and Great Britain (Squarzina, 1963). Sulfur
is the base of oil of vitriol, and of almost all the acids and alkalis which are extensively used in various
manufacturing processes. It is also required for the manufacture of gunpowder as well as for the production of
various medicines (Rawson, 1840). Even if industrial substitutes for sulfur have been discovered and developed
since the late 1840s, the use of sulfur gained again momentum because of its use in grape cultivation as a
fungicide. Still in 1940 sulfur accounted for 20% of Sicily’s total export value (Pescosolido, 2010).
13Sicilian sulfur production and export almost coincided since, throughout the XIX century, virtually no
sulfur-intensive industries were active in the region, letting aside its use in grape cultivation.
14We focus on export volumes because, around the 1830s, prices experienced considerable fluctuations due to
the establishment and the subsequent dissolution of a monopoly (they remained relatively stable afterwards).
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Figure 1: Export of Sicilian sulfur
Note: Thousands of tons of sulfur exported from Sicily. Sources: Squarzina (1963) and
Cancila (1995).
clear than for sulfur and Sicily was never a quasi-monopolist in the market for citrus fruits as
it was in the sulfur market. Although citrus fruits cultivations were especially concentrated
in the areas areas around Palermo and the surrounding Conca d’Oro where early mafia’s
presence was considerable, as reported in the 1885 parliamentary enquiry (Damiani, 1885)
and depicted in figure 2, the cultivation of citrus was similarly widespread in the eastern
part of Sicily, where the mafia remained virtually absent until the second part of the XX
century. One possibly insightful way to empirically investigate this rather puzzling issue is to
look at the distribution of the inputs employed in citrus cultivation: land and water. While
Sicily’s climatic conditions and soil composition are generally favorable to the cultivation of
citrus fruits - particularly in coastal areas - such cultivation requires abundant and regular
availability of water which, instead, tends to vary substantially across different areas of Sicily.
Indeed, underground water basins tend to be scarcer in the Western part of Sicily, so that
in this areas the provision of water to cultivated areas crucially depends on superficial water
channels, which have historically been easily controllable by the mafia. As a result, the
extortion power over citrus producers, and hence the possibility to appropriate rents from
citrus cultivation, could be expected to be higher in Western than in Eastern Sicily. Indeed,
most water guards in the second half of the XIX century were related to the mafia and not
surprisingly, the first known mafia-related murder was that of a water guard, who was killed
in 1874 in the context of the fight between different mafia families over water control (Cutrera,
1900).15
15All the other competing explanations of mafia activity (including, among others, land fragmentation,
ruggedness and population density) will be discussed in the next section.
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Figure 2: Citrus cultivation
Note: Share of land cultivated with citrus fruits over total cultivated land, by quintiles of
the distribution. Darker shades represent higher shares. Missing values are represented
in white. Source: Damiani (1885)
4 Data
To test the main predictions of our theoretical argument, we look at differences across Sicilian
municipalities. To do so, we use historical data on the presence of the mafia and on the
availability of sulphur in the late XIX century, as well as data on a wide range of geographical
and historical controls. In what follows we describe the data sources and discuss how the
variables used in the empirical analysis are constructed.
4.1 Mafia
Our primary source of data on the early diffusion of the mafia in Sicily is represented by
the work of Cutrera (1900). Former law-enforcement official and one of the major experts of
the phenomenon of the time, Cutrera collected detailed information on the intensity of the
activity of the mafia in 285 Sicilian municipalities in the last decades of the XIX century.
In particular, for each municipality, Cutrera assessed the intensity of mafia activity on a
four-point scale ranging from none, to low, intermediate and high. Cutrera’s data have
been extensively used in previous historical and sociological studies on the Sicilian mafia,
including Gambetta’s seminal contribution (1993). An alternative source of information on
the early incidence of mafia activity is represented by the Damiani-Jacini parliamentary
enquiry (Damiani, 1885).16 This was part of a nation-wide inquiry conducted between 1881
and 1885 with the primary aim of collecting information on the conditions of the peasantry
16An additional source is the Borsani-Bonfadini parliamentary enquiry on the conditions of Sicily conducted
between 1874 and 1876. However, this inquiry only reports the 43 municipalities (out of 357) in which the
mafia appears to be more widespread. Given its limited scope, we do not use these data in our empirical
analysis.
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under the newly unified state.17 In addition to extensive municipal-level information on a
variety of agriculture-related variables, the Damiani-Jacini inquiry contains information on
the intensity of mafia activity in 158 Sicilian districts (mandamenti).18 This information was
collected through a questionnaire transmitted to lower court magistrates (pretori) who were
asked to assess the intensity of the activity of the mafia in their district of jurisdiction on a
four-point scale analogous to that used by Cutrera.19
We believe that Cutrera’s data are preferable to Damiani-Jacini’s for several reasons.
First, unlike Damiani-Jacini’s, Cutrera’s data are available at the municipal level and cover
the large majority of Sicilian municipalities (about 80%), allowing for a more extensive and
finer empirical assessment of the relationship between sulfur availability and early mafia ac-
tivity. One important drawback of the Damiani-Jacini’s data is that the reported level of
mafia activity is solely based on the subjective assessment of respondents and is therefore
susceptible to differences in the evaluation criteria adopted by local officials. Actual unaware-
ness, fear of retaliation or contiguity with the mafia would, for example, bias respondents
towards underreporting the level of activity of the mafia in their jurisdiction, introducing
measurement error in the measure. As discussed in Pazzona (2010), the problem would be
even more severe if such factors were themselves correlated with actual mafia activity, (or to
its determinants). Cutrera’s measure is likely to be less vulnerable to this concern. On the
one hand, there is no reason to believe Cutrera would employ different evaluation criteria
when assessing the level of activity of the mafia in different municipalities. On the other hand,
given his position of outside observer, it is reasonable to think that Cutrera’s assessment of
mafia activity would be relatively unresponsive to the specific incentives faced by local offi-
cials (and, indirectly, to the actual strength of mafiaactivity). We therefore believe that the
use of Cutrera’s measure would mitigate the empirical problems discussed above, although
we do not claim that it eliminates them. Athough our empirical analysis will primarily rely
on Cutrera’s data, we will also test the robustness of our findings using the Damiani-Jacini’s
district-level data. In what follows, we indicate with maf c and maf d, the index of mafia
intensity based respectively on Cutrera and Damiani-Jacini.
The geographical distribution of the Sicilian mafia in the late XIX century, based re-
spectively on Cutrera’s and Damiani-Jacini’s data, is depicted in Figure 4.1. Relative to
Damiani-Jacini’s, Cutreras’ data indicate that the mafia was more present in the Western
part of the island, particularly in the areas around Palermo and Agrigento. This pattern,
largely consistent with numerous reports from historians and early mafia experts (see Lupo,
1993 and Sylos Labini, 2003 among others), is further reassuring on the accuracy of Cutrera’s
17The inquiry started in 1881 and was completed at the end of 1884. The main questionnaire on the
conditions of the agrarian class was transmitted to all Sicilian mayors on May 20th 1883. A complete version
of the questionnaire can be found at page V, volume XIII, tome II, fascicle IV of the official inquiry report.
18Post-unification Sicily was characterized by four levels of administrative division: the largest was the
province, followed by the department (circondario), the district (mandamento), and the municipality (co-
mune). Overall, Sicily was divided into 7 provinces (Caltanissetta, Catania, Girgenti, Messina, Noto, Palermo,
Trapani), 24 departments, 179 districts and 357 municipalities.
19The jurisdiction of low court magistrates coincided with the district; hence their assessment of the activity
of the mafia reported in the Damiani-Jacini inquiry has to be understood as referring to the entire district
area, and not just to one or more municipalities within the district. This aspect has generated some confusion
among users of the Damiani-Jacini’s data (Bandiera, 2003; Pazzona, 2010; Dimico et al., 2012), who appear
to have erroneously interpreted the information on the activity of the mafia as referring to the municipal
rather than the district level. This confusion can probably be attributed to the presence, in most districts, of
municipalities with the same name as the district they are part of (e.g. municipality of Messina in the district
of Messina, municipality of Girgenti in the district of Girgenti, etc.).
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Figure 3: Geographic distribution of the Sicilian mafia in the late XIX century
(a) Cutrera (b) Damiani-Jacini
The figure reports the assessment of the intensity of mafia activity according to Cutrera (left) and
Damiani-Jacini (right), with darker colors indicating more intense mafia’s activity (missing values
are reported in white). Cutrera’s data are at the municipality level while Damiani-Jacini’s are at the
district level. Missing values correspond to cases for which it was not possible to match historical
municipalities (or districts) to current ones, e.g. for municipalities created in the XX century.
4.2 Sulfur and other geographical and historical controls
With regard to the presence of sulfur, comprehensive municipal data are available from
Squarzina (1963). These include information on the number of sulfur mines in each Sicilian
municipality in 1886 - that is, around the pick of Sicily’s sulfur export boom. Since we are
interested in gauging the original stock of sulphur available in each municipality - hence prior
to the intense depletion which took place throughout the XIX century - we consider those
mines that were still operating in 1886 as well as those that were already exhausted by then.
It is worth emphasizing, once again, that Sicilian sulfur was generally superficial so that its
extraction was relatively unchallenging and did not require considerable investments; as a
consequence, at the peak of Sicily’s sulfur export boom, virtually all major sulfur reserves
on the island had been tapped (Squarzina, 1963). In light of this fact, the presence of sulfur
mines can be considered a good proxy for the exogenous distribution of sulfur reserves, which
is ultimately our variable of interest. The distribution of sulfur mines in each municipality
(labeled sulfur henceforth), is summarized in Figure 4.2.
In our empirical analysis we control for a range of other geographical and historical vari-
ables at the municipal level. We focus, in particular, on factors that may have influenced the
demand and supply of protection and, at the same time, may be correlated with the presence
20A visual inspection of the two maps highlights incoherent patterns in Damiani-Jacini’s data, that are at
odds with a diffusive process as the mafia is likely to be. Take for example the northwestern area around
Palermo: Palermo and its surrounding coastal municipalities are all characterized by high mafia activity,
while most of the other neighboring southern municipalities are all coded as having no mafia activity. Going
further south, again many municipalities turn to be flagged as high mafia ones. Conversely, Cutrera’s map
shows a much smoother spatial pattern in terms of intensity of mafia activity, suggesting a more careful and
homogeneous assessment of the variable.
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Figure 4: Geographic distribution of Sicilian sulfur mines (1886)
The figure reports the number of sulfur mines (both active and exhausted) recorded in each
Sicilian municipality in 1886 on a four-color scale: 0 (lighter gray), 1-10, 11-30, more than
30 (darker gray).
of sulfur, in order to test that sulphur availability has an independent effect on the emergence
of the mafia and is not merely proxying for other characteristics.
To account for difference in topography, we control for terrain ruggedness and elevation.
As discussed by Nunn and Puga (2012), in addition to its obvious effect on agricultural
productivity and trade, rugged terrain - in the form of hills, caves and cliffs - provides look-
out posts and hiding places for individuals trying to escape. Arguably, in the context of
Sicily rugged areas provided outlaws with better protection from police forces. This view is
consistent with accounts by various historians; for example, when discussing the widespread
presence of the mafia in the mountainous towns of Gangi, Lupo (2004) emphasizes the im-
portance of the town’s impervious location which made it particularly difficult for law en-
forcement officers to establish control over the surrounding area and apprehend criminals. To
account for this aspect, we include in our regressions a municipal measure of terrain rugged-
ness constructed from the Global Land One-km Base Elevation Project (GLOBE), a global
gridded digital elevation data set covering the Earth’s surface at a 10-minute spatial reso-
lution (approximately 1km).21 Relatedly, we also control for difference in elevation within
a given area, a variable which has been identified in the literature as imposing significant
limitations on both agriculture and breeding activities (Michalopoulos, 2011; Grigg, 1995;
Lupo, 1993). In particular, we use data on the maximum difference in altitude in a given
municipality available from the Italian Institute of Statistics (ISTAT).
21The GLOBE data set has superseded the GTOP30 which, before the introduction of GLOBE, was con-
sidered the most accurate digital elevation data set and had been used, among others, by Nunn and Puga
(2012).
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We are also interested in controlling for the suitability of local land for various types of
crops, as this is likely to have affected the demand for protection of agricultural goods. In
fact, while some low-value crops (i.e. cereals) were consumed locally, others (e.g. citrus fruits,
olive, sumac) were high-value export goods which demanded a degree of protection similar
to that of sulfur. To account for this aspect, we include in our regressions measures of land
suitability for the three most widespread crop categories in XIX century Sicily: i) citrus fruits,
ii) cereals, and iii) olives. These measures are constructed using data on crop-specific agro-
ecological suitability available from the IIASA-FAO Global Agro-Ecological Zones project
(GAEZ).22 The GAEZ data are in grid format, have a very high resolution (1’), and assign to
each grid cell a value from 0 (totally unsuitable), to 100 (very suitable). To obtain suitability
measures at the municipality level we average the individual suitability score of all the cells
in a given municipality. We focus on crop suitability - determined in large part by exogenous
soil properties and climatic conditions - rather than on actual crop production to minimize
concerns of possible reverse effects of the presence of the mafia on the prevalence of particular
crops. Nevertheless, in the last part of our analysis, to test one of the alternative hypothesis
about the emergence of the mafia, we use information on the proportion of land devoted
to the cultivation of citrus fruits in each municipality, available from the Damiani-Jacini’s
inquiry. Given the importance of irrigation for several of the crops mentioned above, and
in light of the accounts of various observers about the crucial role played by the mafia in
controlling water supply, we also control for the relative scarcity of water in a given area
using data on the presence of underground water basins available from the Sicilian Waters
Observatory.
Another set of controls is intended to capture factors such as access to major ways of com-
munication and proximity to the main ports, which were arguably important determinants
of the value of protection. The first variable, labeled as postal roads, indicates whether, at
the beginning of the XIX century, a municipality had direct access to one of the postal roads
which connected Sicily’s largest towns. The data are derived from the digitalization and
geo-referentiation of a detailed historical map of Sicily in late XVIII century (Cary, 1799),
hence prior to the steady rise in sulfur’s international demand. Other variables include the
distance of a municipality’s centroid from the closest non-seasonal river (river distance), and
distance from the closest commercial port (port distance).23
We also control for a set of socio-economic and demographic characteristics which could
potentially be related to both sulphur availability and mafia presence. In particular, to
account for the fact that crime incidence might be higher in more densely populated areas
(Glaeser et al., 1996; Glaeser and Sacerdote, 1999; Buonanno et al., 2012) we control for a
measure of population density (density) based on data on municipal population from the
1861 census.24 Relatedly, to control for possible differences between rural and urban areas,
22More information on the FAO-GAEZ project can be found at http://www.gaez.iiasa.ac.at/. Data from
FAO-GAEZ have been used extensively by economists in recent years to investigate a variety of topics. Ex-
amples include Nunn and Qian (2011), Michalopoulos (2011) and Durante (2009).
23Sicily’s main commercial ports were: Mazara del Vallo, Porto Empedocle, Trapani, Siracusa, Catania,
Palermo and Messina.
24By 1861 Sicily’s total population amounted to 2.1 million, accounting for more than 10% of Italy’s pop-
ulation. Population density was more than 81 inhabitants per squared kilometer, roughly comparable to the
current density of Spain. Since then, the increase in population has been rather homogeneous across Sicilian
municipalities, resulting in a correlation between population in 2001 and in 1861of of 0.95. Palermo, the
capital, was Sicily’s largest and denser city, with a population of 185,000 inhabitants and a density of 1,000
inhabitants per squared kilometer, comparable to that of current mid-size Italian cities.
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we also define a dummy variable, urban, indicating whether a municipality is located at a
distance of 10Km or less from one of Sicily’s then five largest cities.25
Finally, we also control for the degree of land fragmentation, a factor which previous
contributions have related to the development of a florid market for private protection and
the consequent emergence of the mafia (Bandiera, 2003). Information on the degree of land
fragmentation in each municipality is available from one of the questionnaires of the Damiani-
Jacini’s inquiry in which mayors where asked to report whether land in their municipality
was prevalently composed by small, medium or large landholdings. In particular, we define a
dummy variable, fragmentation, taking value one for municipality where small and medium
landholdings were prevalent, and zero in those in which large landholding still existed. Due
to the rather low response rate to this question, data on fragmentation are available for only
237 out of the 285 municipalities in our sample.
The availability of data at the municipal level allow us to include in all our regression de-
partment specific fixed effects which capture the political and historical background common
to municipalities in the same department. In particular, since in the period under exami-
nation the Sicilian administrative, judicial and law-enforcement systems were organized at
department level, the inclusion of 24 department fixed effects allow us to estimate the effect
of sulphur on mafia by comparing municipalities characterized by a fairly homogenous level
of institutional quality.
5 Empirical Analysis
This section presents the empirical assessment of how geographical variations in sulfur en-
dowment contributed to the emergence of the Sicilian mafia. As discussed above, over the
XIX century Sicily experienced the collapse of the Bourbon Kingdom and a generalized sit-
uation of weak law enforcement. Over the same century, international demand for sulfur
soared and most of the world supply came from Sicily. Municipalities with sulfur reserves
thus experienced a boom in the value of their natural resources.26 We exploit the exogenous
distribution of sulfur reserves to identify the effects of such boom on mafia’s emergence. We
document a resource curse, by which valuable natural resources fostered protection demand
and extortion opportunities, thus favoring the emergence of organized crime.
5.1 Municipality-level estimates
Table 2 provides our first clear evidence of the importance of sulfur for mafia’s emergence.
It reports municipality-level OLS estimates of our preferred mafia measure (maf c) on the
number of sulfur mines (sulfur). The different columns gradually increase the number of
control variables.27 Column 1 shows that, in a univariate regression (including a constant, as
in all regressions in all tables), the estimated coefficient on sulfur, significant at the 1% level,
is equal to 0.033, implying that a one standard deviation increase in sulfur leads to an increase
25These include: Palermo, Catania, Trapani, Messina and Girgenti.
26As already shown in figure 1, sulfur export in Sicily grew at an impressive rate of 9% throughout the
period 1830 and 1860 and in that period Sicily served around 90% of the world sulfur demand. sulfur export
was negligible at the beginning of the XIX century, peaked at the end of that century (reaching 540,000 tons
in 1901) and sharply declined in the XX century (by 1976, it was only 85,000 tons).
27Since maf c is an ordinal variable, we repeated the entire analysis using ordered probit, obtaining analogous
results, which are available upon request.
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in maf c by more than one sixth of a standard deviation.28 Column 2 adds department fixed
effects. This is our first step in tackling the issue of whether differences in sulfur endowment
pick up differences in other variables, which may matter for mafia’s emergence. Such fixed
effects control for any characteristic that was common within each department. The result
shows that even within each department, municipality-level variations in sulfur endowment
were positively and significantly associated to variations in early mafia’s presence (the point
estimate is 0.022 and it is significant at the 1% level).
To minimize the risk that within-department variations in sulfur endowment are related
to differences in other variables, which may themselves be related to mafia activity, columns
3 to 7 progressively add municipality-level controls for differences in agriculture, geography,
transportation and communication, socio-demographic variables and land fragmentation (al-
ways including department fixed effects). No matter which controls we include, sulfur remains
highly significant and the magnitude of the coefficient is barely affected, suggesting that our
main result is not driven by any omitted variable.29
The first group of additional control variables contains exogenous soil characteristics,
which are related to agricultural activity: column 3 includes soil suitability for cultivation
of citrus fruits, cereals and olives, as well as a dummy for water scarcity. It is important to
control for such factors because many scholars have argued that mafia’s emergence was related
to citrus cultivation (Lupo, 2004; Gambetta, 1993; Dickie, 2004; Del Monte and Pennacchio,
2012; Dimico et al., 2012) and also to mafia’s possibility to control scarce water resources
and thus have high extortionary power towards agricultural production (Sylos Labini, 2003).
Both suitability for cereals and for citrus have a significant effect, the former positive and
the latter negative, but only the former effect remains significant as additional controls are
introduced. These results do not support the widely held idea that early mafia’s development
was related to citrus cultivation. Column 4 adds two geographic controls: average ruggedness
and difference in elevation (Nunn and Puga, 2012; Michalopoulos, 2011). Ruggedness is never
significant, while difference in elevation is strongly significant and positive. Column 5 adds the
presence of 1799 postal roads, as well as distance from the closest non-seasonal river and from
the closest commercial port. Mafia’s presence was significantly higher in municipalities along
old postal roads, whereas distances from rivers and ports are not significant. Column 6 further
adds population density in 1861 and a dummy for urban municipalities. Such variables are
related to the level of economic activity, both legal and illegal (see, e.g. Glaeser and Sacerdote,
1999; Buonanno et al., 2012). In line with the literature, we find that population density
is positively and significantly related to mafia’s emergence. Finally, column 7 adds land
fragmentation, which according to Bandiera (2003) should be relevant for mafia’s emergence,
but we find no support for her thesis.
As an additional robustness check, we re-run our baseline regression substituting the
number of sulfur mines (sulfur) with a dummy (sulfur d) for the presence of at least a mine
in the municipality. Using sulfur d is important because we do not have information on the
quantity of sulfur extracted in each mine and we therefore put ourselves in the worst case
scenario, that is we do not exploit at all the information on the intensive margin in the
distribution of sulfur. Table 3 reproduces the same specifications of Table 2, but it replaces
28Given the linearity implied by the measure of mafia activity, it takes 30 mines more to have an increase
in mafia activity from one level (not present, presence is low, intermediate, high) to the next.
29The coefficient on sulfur is only raised when we add land fragmentation to the controls. Yet, notice that
this reduces sample size from 282 to 237 municipalities since, as discussed in the previous section, information
on fragmentation are available only for 237 municipalities.
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sulfur d (the dummy for the presence of at least a sulfur mine in a municipality) for sulfur.
For the sake of space, we only report the coefficient of sulfur d. Results show that, even if
we neglect the information on the intensive margin of sulfur extraction and only rely on the
extensive margin, the presence of sulfur is still significant to explain Mafia’s emergence. Yet,
the slight decrease in significance levels also suggests that the intensive margin was relevant
as well.
While the above analysis suggests that omitted variables are not driving our results, as
an additional check we control for possible spatial effects. There is no reason to believe that
mafia’s activity follows the administrative boundaries of municipalities. Mafia lords may
indeed offer protection and practice extortion in neighboring municipalities, whose territory
they control. They may also establish agreements with other mafia lords, who control different
territories, for instance to grant protection to their clients’ goods transiting through them.
Moreover, protection externalities may foster mafia’s activity in a municipality just because
the mafia is active in neighboring municipalities. There may therefore be relevant spatial
spillovers from a municipality to its neighbors. Omitting to take them into account may
reduce the efficiency of our estimates and bias them.
To address this issue, we estimate a spatial model by means of the generalized spatial two
stage least squares (GS2SLS) estimator of Kelejian and Prucha (1998). Results are presented
in table 4, which reproduces the same specification of column 6 of table 2.30 We employ both
a non-standardized (columns 1 to 3) and a row-standardized (columns 4 to 6) contiguity
matrix. We implement a spatial error model (columns 1 and 4), a spatial autoregressive
model (columns 2 and 5) and a model that combines the two by considering both a spatial
lag and a spatial error structure (columns 3 and 6).31
Spatial analysis is consistent with our baseline estimates. Interestingly, the coefficients on
the spatial structure are almost always significant when using the row-standardized contiguity
matrix, suggesting that mafia’s activity in neighboring municipalities is indeed relevant and
thus spatial estimates are justified. Yet, the sign of the spatial lag is not robust across
specifications, so one should be cautious in its interpretation. By contrast, the main result of
the spatial analysis is that, across all specifications, sulfur is always positively and significantly
related to mafia density, with a point estimated which is very close to the one estimated in
table 2, column 6.
The above analysis controls for a great number of observed variables, as well as for any
unobserved variable that is common to all municipalities in a department. Yet, in principle
there is still the possibility that sulfur-rich municipalities differ from other municipalities of
the same department along some other unobserved characteristic, that might be relevant for
mafia’s emergence. This for instance might be the case if sulfur had always been a relevant
source of rents, even in previous centuries. Although we have already documented that
30We use column 6 rather than column 7 to avoid the reduction in sample size implied by missing data for
land fragmentation. Yet, results are robust to the inclusion of the latter variable.
31If neighboring units have similar intercepts due to their proximity, spatial dependence appears only in
the error term (LeSage and Pace, 2009) and a Spatial Error model (SEM) should be estimated. In that case,
omitting the spatial specification of the error term would reduce efficiency of the estimator, while preserving
consistency (Anselin, 1988). In turn, if mafia’s density in one municipality is directly affected by mafia’s
activity in neighboring locations, one should estimate a Spatial Autoregressive model (SAR), which includes
among regressors a spatial lag, that is, a weighted average of mafia’s activity in neighboring municipalities. A
(non-standardized) contiguity is a proximity matrix that associates 1 to each pair of municipalities sharing a
border and 0 to any other pair (the diagonal is set to 0 by convention). Row-standardization is obtained by
normalizing the sum of each row of the matrix to 1. The difference between the first and the second case is
that the spatial lag captures total and average mafia’s activity in neighboring municipalities, respectively.
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sulfur exports were negligible at the beginning of the XIX century, to indirectly test for this
possibility we investigate whether sulfur presence was correlated to population growth in the
XVII and XVIII centuries.32 We focus on those Sicilian municipalities for which we have
data for years between 1600 and 1800 (a period characterized by Malthusian regime in which
development is proxied by population growth) and construct long term yearly population
growth rates.33 Different specifications of a growth regression that have sulfur (and log of
initial population to control for convergence) as controls show that sulfur had no economic
role in the economic development of Sicilian municipalities before the beginning of the XIX
century. Results are reported in table 5.
5.2 District-level estimates
In our baseline regressions we used our preferred measure of mafia intensity, maf c, which is
available at the municipality level. In order to obtain estimates directly comparable with other
studies (Bandiera, 2003; Pazzona, 2010; Dimico et al., 2012), we employ the mafia measure as
defined in the Damiani-Jacini parliamentary inquiry, maf d, which is only available at district
level, for 158 Sicilian districts.
We replicate the analysis proposed in our baseline regression presented in table 2, with
the same specification: regressing maf d on sulfur and the controls presented and discussed
in the previous sections. Since estimates exploit district-level information on mafia’s activity,
we correspondingly re-define all our regressors at this level of geographical and administrative
aggregation. District-level findings are presented in table 6. Throughout all the regressions,
the estimated coefficient on sulfur is strongly significant and is extremely stable, suggesting
that our results are not driven by any omitted variable.
As previously stated, the use of maf d is not only useful as a robustness check, but it
also allows a more direct comparison with earlier and subsequent contributions. In particu-
lar, Bandiera (2003), who also uses district-level data, provides early evidence, based on 70
districts located in the western part of Sicily, supporting the idea that land fragmentation
may have favored mafia’s emergence; while on the contrary Pazzona (2010) provides evidence
that the origins of the Sicilian mafia are rooted in the presence of large landholdings. Our
results, both those based on all the 158 available districts, as well as those presented in Table
2, based on 237 municipalities, do not support their arguments.
5.3 Neighbor-pair fixed effects
So far we have presented consistent and robust findings, documenting the significant effect
of the presence of sulfur on mafia’s origins. Since sulfur is not randomly distributed across
Sicily, but rather geographically concentrated, we have relied on department fixed effects and
on municipality-level controls to make sure that differences in sulfur endowment do not pick
up the effects of some other characteristics, which may be relevant for mafia’s emergence.
In this section we go even deeper and, rather than comparing municipalities with different
sulfur endowments within a given department, we follow Acemoglu et al. (2012) and exploit
variations in sulfur endowments across direct neighbors.
32Under the assumption that Sicily was on a Malthusian development path before the XIX century, if sulfur
was a relevant source of rents, this should translate in higher rates of population growth where it was present.
33Data for population of Italian towns between 1300 and 1861 are available from Paolo Malanima at:
http://www.paolomalanima.it/DEFAULT files/Page646.htm
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In particular, we restrict our analysis to the 48 municipalities which have sulfur mines and
the 54 municipalities without sulfur mines which are adjacent to them.34 As in Acemoglu et
al. (2012), we implement the neighbor-pair fixed effects estimator, very similar to a matching
methodology and to a regression discontinuity design, comparing each sulfur-mining munic-
ipality to each of its neighbors. Figure 5 visually presents municipalities with sulfur mines
and their neighbors.
This empirical strategy makes it possible to directly control for unobservables that are
common across adjacent municipalities by including neighbor-pair fixed effects. Indeed, we
rely on the assumption that adjacent municipalities faced similar institutional and contextual
conditions (i.e. law enforcement, state presence, culture, labor market, geography), and are
likely to be very similar across any other unobservables. Within the neighbor pair, we claim
that the exogenous source of variation in mafia’s activity is the presence of sulfur mines.
Figure 5: Municipalities with sulfur mines and their neighbors
Note: White municipalities are excluded from the analysis because both them and their neigh-
bors do not host sulfur. Light grey municipalities are those 54 without sulfur that have neighbor-
ing municipalities with sulfur (the 35 in dark grey). Black municipalities are excluded because,
even if endowed with sulfur, they do not neighbor any non-sulfur municipality.
Formally (see Acemoglu et al. (2012) for a more complete description), we define with S
the subset of municipalities with sulfur mines and with N(s) all the adjacent municipalities
without sulfur mines of each element of S. We use s and i to index municipalities with and
without sulfur mines, respectively. We estimate the following model by means of OLS:
maf cs = βsulfurs + γX
′
s + ψsi + νs s ∈ S (1)
34Note that although 48 municipalities have sulfur mines, 13 of them have as only neighbors other munici-
palities with sulfur, so they cannot be exploited in this analysis.
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maf ci = βsulfuri + γX
′
i + ψsi + νi i ∈ N(s) (2)
where X ′t collects municipality-level controls, ψsi represents common unobservables for the
neighbor pair (s,i) and νt represents municipality-specific unobservables. Neighbor-pair fixed
effects estimates are presented in table 7. For simplicity we only present the coefficient on
sulfur, but consistently with table 2 we progressively add all the controls described in the
previous section. The coefficient of sulfur in the neighbor-pair fixed effects estimates is always
significant and its magnitude is very close to our baseline findings, providing additional and
compelling evidence on the role played by sulfur endowment in mafia’s emergence.
5.4 Citrus cultivation
Here we further explore whether the hypothesis, often carried on in the literature that there
is a strong connection between cultivation of citrus fruit and the Sicilian mafia, is supported
by empirical evidence. In most of the specifications previously presented, to which we refer
to, we included an exogenous measure of land suitability for citrus cultivation from GAEZ
(discussed above). This variable never appeared to be significant.35 In order to differently
address the issue related to the role of citrus we now include, among the controls, a trans-
formation of the share of cultivable land cultivated with citrus fruits as reported by Damiani
(1885).36 In particular, given the skewed distribution of this variable, we define 5 different
dummies equal to 1 whether the share of citrus crops in a municipality is respectively higher
than 0, higher than 1%, higher than 5%, higher than 10% and higher than the mean of all
municipalities.37 Table 8 presents results that include, among the regressors, the citrus dum-
mies previously defined. The first five columns uses data at municipality level and therefore
our main dependent variable maf c. None of the dummies flagging those municipalities with
high incidence of citrus cultivation turns positive and significant, suggesting that, if any,
everything has already been controlled for the exogenous drivers of citrus cultivation.38 It
is in fact true that the share of citrus cultivation can be highly endogenous and therefore a
causal effect difficult to be identified.39 Replicating the analysis using district-level data and
maf d as dependent variable does not change the results, i.e. none of the dummies for citrus
cultivation are significant.
35As already reported, Cancila (1995) stresses that citrus fruits were mainly cultivated in the eastern part
of Sicily (in the provinces of Catania and Messina), while those cultivated in the Conca d’Oro around Palermo
were mainly for the local market.
36Dimico et al. (2012) use a dummy equals to one whether citrus is the dominant crop in the department,
while Del Monte and Pennacchio (2012) use as citrus intensity a 1 to 3 scale of undefined productivity
subjectively attributed from Cutrera (1900) to the 24 Sicilian departments. It is worth to stress that Dimico
et al. (2012) do not include data for the municipalities belonging to the province of Caltanissetta, despite data
on Caltanissetta are available in the anastatic reprints of the five volumes of the Damiani (1885) inquiry cited
above.
37More than 55% of Sicilian municipalities did not have crops cultivated with citrus fruits, while the share of
land cultivated with citrus fruits was more than 10% and 20% in the 12% and 5% of the Sicilian municipalities,
respectively.
38We also replicate the same estimates excluding citrus suitability from the set of controls, however estimates
remain unchanged.
39Dimico et al. (2012) instrument their variable on citrus prevalence with altitude. As we widely described
altitude and ruggedness may exert a direct effect on mafia emergence. Thus, altitude does not satisfy the
exclusion restriction.
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5.5 Mafia’s persistence
Although the main purpose of our research is to shed light on the historical determinants
of the emergence of the mafia, we are also interested in understanding to what extent these
factors have had persistent effect on the presence of the mafia today. In particular, we an-
alyze whether the incidence of mafia activities today is correlated with the presence of the
mafia in the early stages of its development. In order to pursue our goal we measure today
mafia intensity by means of several variables available at the municipality level: (i) dissolu-
tion of municipal administration due to mafia infiltrations; (ii) seized firms and (iii) seized
real estate properties. We define a dummy that takes value one whether the municipality
council dissolved due to mafia infiltration over the period 1991 to 2011 (source: Ministero
dell’Interno) and two dummies equal to one respectively whether at least a firm and at least
a real estate/property have been seized by the Italian judicial authority in the municipality
at the end of 2011 (source: Agenzia del Demanio).40 It is worth to notice that over the
considered period more than 10% of Sicilian municipalities were dissolved and firms and real
estate properties were seized respectively in more than 23% and 44% of Sicilian municipal-
ities. Morevoer, we also consider non-mafia related crime rates per 100,000 inhabitants at
the municipality level as a falsification test (source: Polizia di Stato, Ministero dell’Interno).
Indeed, we should expect that given the strict territorial control exerted by the Sicilian mafia,
property crime should be unaffected or even lowered in municipalities with a stronger pres-
ence of mafia. We propose a simple instrumental variable approach in which the first stage is
specification presented in column 2 of table 2 (i.e. maf c regressed on sulfur and department
fixed effects) and the second stage is a measure of crime today on the instrumented measure
of historical mafia (i.e., maf c). Instrumental variable estimates, presented in table 9 show
a strong effect of early mafia on the actual presence of mafia, confirming the persistence
of the phenomenon over time. Moreover, petty crime rates (i.e., theft, burglary, car theft
and robbery) are in some cases negatively affected by the presence of the mafia in the early
stages of its development, suggesting that the territorial and social control of mafia acts as a
deterrent to non-mafia related crimes.
6 Conclusions
We presented a general framework useful to interpret the emergence of mafia-type organiza-
tions as a combination of weak state and the presence of valuable natural resources. We have
applied this framework to the case of the emergence of the Sicilian mafia, occurred during the
XIX century, arguing that the demise of Sicilian feudalism and of Bourbon Kingdom gener-
ated a widespread power vacuum that triggered the development of a large potential supply
of private protection. At the same time, in those areas characterized by the extraction and
commercialization of sulfur, whose international demand was soaring, the demand for private
protection boomed. We collected a new dataset with detailed information on mafia activity
and presence of sulfur mines at the municipality level and we indeed found a strong causal
effect of the presence of sulfur, proxied by the number of mines, on mafia activity. We claim
the effect of sulfur on mafia activity to be causal, or its lower bound estimate, since sulfur
is exogenously distributed as any natural resource, it is easily discoverable in Sicily since it
40Law n. 221 (July 1991) sets the rule for council dissolution due to mafia infiltration. Law n. 646
(September 1982), known as Law“Rognoni - La Torre” rules the seizure of firms and real estate properties
belonging to mafia-like organizations.
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is mainly superficial and until the beginning of XIX it was commercially barely useless. Our
findings are robust when using data at a lower level of aggregation and using another, less
reliable measure of mafia activity. Also, allowing for a spatial structure of both the level of
mafia and the errors leads to the same results. Lastly, restricting the analysis only to pairs
of adjacent municipalities with and without sulfur mines, in a RDD fashion, does not change
the main message.
On top of finding a fundamental result on the causal link running from sulfur to mafia, our
work also reviews and tests previous findings on the causes of the emergence of Sicilian mafia.
In general none of the usual suspects for the emergence of mafia are empirically relevant, in
particular once we control for fixed effects at the level of the 24 districts, the judicial and
administrative divisions at which law enforcement was organized. Specifically, we do not
find neither an historical nor an empirical support for the claim, proposed by old and recent
literature, that the presence of citrus cultivation should causally provoke the emergence of
mafia.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
maf c 282 1.433 1.140 0 3
maf d 158 .689 1.064 0 3
Sulfur 282 1.986 7.099 0 61
Sulfur dummy 282 .167 .373 0 1
Citrus suitability 282 15.608 7.658 0 48
Cereals suitability 282 17.728 11.149 1.490 66.380
Olive suitability 282 30.906 12.065 3.478 69.273
Water scarcity 282 0.702 0.458 0 1
Ruggedness 282 433.630 195.940 58.017 1,149.332
Diff. elevation 282 796.837 519.126 48 3,232
Postal roads 282 0.550 0.498 0 1
River distance 282 9.279 7.247 .992 42.075
Port distance 282 37.924 19.371 0.132 83.919
Urban 282 0.124 0.330 0 1
Density 282 132.412 126.861 4.856 1,177.986
Fragmentation 237 0.759 0.428 0 1
Note: Descriptive statistics of the main variables used in the empirical analysis. Data is at the municipality
level except for maf d that is collected at the district level.
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Table 2: Baseline estimates
Dependent variable: maf c
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Sulfur .0329∗∗∗ .0224∗∗∗ .0237∗∗∗ .0228∗∗ .0234∗∗ .0239∗∗∗ .0549∗∗∗
(.0105) (.0082) (.0089) (.0091) (.0092) (.0089) (.0127)
Citrus suitabiliy -.0251∗ -.0155 -.0235 -.0227 -.0293
(.0150) (.0151) (.0163) (.0166) (.0180)
Cereals suitabiliy .0235∗∗ .0223∗∗ .0224∗∗ .0224∗∗ .0296∗∗∗
(.0108) (.0108) (.0107) (.0110) (.0111)
Olive suitabiliy -.0037 -.0039 .0009 -.0016 -.0001
(.0119) (.0119) (.0131) (.0129) (.0145)
Water scarcity .1267 -.0460 -.0231 .0057 -.0548
(.1986) (.1990) (.1923) (.1933) (.2010)
Ruggedness -.0011 -.0010 -.0011 -.0006
(.0008) (.0008) (.0008) (.0009)
Diff. elevation .0004∗∗∗ .0004∗∗∗ .0005∗∗∗ .0006∗∗∗
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0002)
Postal roads .0811 .0975 .1470
(.1008) (.1002) (.1127)
River distance .0101 .0045 .0091
(.0092) (.0094) (.0101)
Port distance -.0087 -.0034 -.0022
(.0060) (.0069) (.0080)
Urban .1855 .0925
(.1898) (.2133)
Density .0013∗∗∗ .0012∗∗
(.0005) (.0005)
Fragmentation .0961
(.1315)
Department FEs N Y Y Y Y Y Y
Obs. 282 282 282 282 282 282 237
R2 0.042 0.567 0.577 0.594 0.601 0.618 0.659
Note: This table presents the results of OLS estimates for Sicilian municipalities for which values for all the variables
are available. The dependent variable is maf c, the level of mafia activity at the end of XIX century as coded by Cutrera
(1900) on a 0 to 3 scale (0 is no mafia activity, 3 is large mafia activity). The main explanatory variable Sulfur is the
number of sulfur mines as collected by Squarzina (1963), while the other control variables are described in the main
text. Department fixed effects are included in all specifications except the first. Robust standard errors are presented in
parentheses. *, ** and *** denote rejection of the null hypothesis of the coefficient being equal to 0 at 10%, 5% and 1%
significance level, respectively.
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Table 3: Baseline with sulfur dummy
Dependent variable: maf c
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Sulfur dummy .5532∗∗∗ .3594∗ .4501∗∗ .3968∗ .4165∗ .4916∗∗ .4550∗∗
(.1765) (.2193) (.2286) (.2370) (.2449) (.2237) (.2168)
Controls
Department FEs N Y Y Y Y Y Y
Suitability and water N N Y Y Y Y Y
Geomorphological N N N Y Y Y Y
Distances N N N N Y Y Y
Sociodemographic N N N N N Y Y
Obs. 282 282 282 282 282 282 237
R2 0.033 0.559 0.570 0.587 0.593 0.613 0.639
Note: Note: This table presents the results of OLS estimates for Sicilian municipalities, for which values for all the
variables are available. The dependent variable is maf c, the level of mafia activity at the end of XIX century as coded
by Cutrera (1900) on a 0 to 3 scale (0 is no mafia activity, 3 is large mafia activity). The main explanatory variable,
Sulfur dummy, is a dummy taking value one if the number of sulfur mines as collected by Squarzina (1963) is greater
than zero, while the other control variables are described in the main text. Department fixed effects are included in all
specifications except the first. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote rejection of
the null hypothesis of the coefficient being equal to 0 at 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively.
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Table 4: Spatial estimates
Dependent variable: maf c
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sulfur .0229∗∗∗ .0234∗∗∗ .0227∗∗∗ .0211∗∗∗ .0234∗∗∗ .0231∗∗∗
(.0072) (.0071) (.0072) (.0071) (.0071) (.0066)
λ .0143 .0149 .4762∗∗∗ .6857∗∗∗
(.010) (.010) (.138) (.113)
ρ .0144 -.0038 0.0497 -0.6252∗∗∗
(.022) (.025) (.103) (.149)
Controls
Department FEs N Y Y Y Y Y
Suitability and water N N Y Y Y Y
Geomorphological N N N Y Y Y
Distances N N N N Y Y
Sociodemographic N N N N N Y
Obs. 282 282 282 282 282 282
Note: This table presents the results of a spatial model estimated by means of the generalized spatial two stage least
squares (GS2SLS) estimator of Kelejian and Prucha (1998). Included controls are the same as in the specification of
column 6 of table 2. Columns 1 to 3 employ a non-standardized contiguity matrix, while a row-standardized one is
used in columns 4 to 6. A Spatial Error model, a Spatial Autoregressive model and a model that combines the two by
considering both a spatial lag and a spatial error structure are respectively presented in columns 1 and 4, columns 2
and 5 and columns 3 and 6. λ is the spatial error term, while ρ is the spatial lag. The dependent variable is maf c, the
level of mafia activity at the end of XIX century as coded by Cutrera (1900) on a 0 to 3 scale (0 is no mafia activity, 3
is large mafia activity). The main explanatory variable, Sulfur, is the number of sulfur mines as collected by Squarzina
(1963), while the other control variables are described in the main text. Department fixed effects are included in all
specifications except the first. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote rejection of
the null hypothesis of the coefficient being equal to 0 at 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively.
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Table 5: Growth regressions
Dependent variable: population growth
1600-1700 1700-1800 1600-1800
(1) (2) (3)
ln(population 1600) -.1660∗∗∗ -.0900∗∗
(.0576) (.0404)
ln(population 1700) -.0761
(.0608)
Sulfur .0003 -.0002 -.0002
(.0030) (.0028) (.0022)
Obs. 47 56 50
R2 .159 .029 .097
Note: This table presents the results of OLS estimates for Sicilian municipalities for which popula-
tion was positive in at least two of the years 1600, 1700 or 1800, according to Malanima’s data
(http://www.paolomalanima.it/DEFAULT files/Page646.htm). The dependent variable is the yearly population growth
while the explanatory variables are the log of population at the beginning of the period and Sulfur, the number of sulfur
mines as collected by Squarzina (1963). Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote
rejection of the null hypothesis of the coefficient being equal to 0 at 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively.
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Table 6: District level estimates
Dependent variable: maf d
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Sulfur .0354∗∗∗ .0318∗∗∗ .0325∗∗∗ .0327∗∗∗ .0326∗∗∗ .0347∗∗∗ .0322∗∗
(.0080) (.0115) (.0116) (.0117) (.0121) (.0122) (.0127)
Citrus suitability .0413 .0483 .0444 .0399 .0378
(.0315) (.0324) (.0344) (.0351) (.0352)
Cereals suitability -.0034 .0024 .0022 .0042 .0016
(.0193) (.0188) (.0196) (.0197) (.0201)
Olive suitability -.0203 -.0203 -.0212 -.0207 -.0155
(.0180) (.0177) (.0198) (.0199) (.0210)
Water scarcity .2763∗ .2842 .2669 .2365 .2078
(.1678) (.1730) (.1711) (.1720) (.1820)
Ruggedness .0010 .0013 .0009 .0007
(.0002) (0.0002) (.0002) (.0002)
Diff. elevation .0002 .0002 .0003 .0003
(.0002) (.0002) (.0002) (.0002)
Postal roads .2210 .2877 .2680
(.1906) (.1947) (.1993)
River distance .0026 -.0022 -.0040
(.0177) (.0182) (.0184)
Port distance -.0009 .0016 .0002
(.0126) (.0145) (.0144)
Urban -.1216 -.1115
(.4075) (.4097)
Density .0014∗ .0014∗
(.0008) (.0008)
Fragmentation -.1847
(.2467)
Department FEs N Y Y Y Y Y Y
Obs. 158 158 158 158 158 158 158
R2 0.105 0.232 0.249 0.259 0.266 0.283 0.288
Note: This table presents the results of OLS estimates for Sicilian districts for which values for all the variables are
included. The dependent variable is maf d, the level of mafia activity around 1883 as coded by Damiani (1885) on a 0
to 3 scale (0 is no mafia activity, 3 is large mafia activity). The main explanatory variable Sulfur is the number of sulfur
mines as collected by Squarzina (1963), while the other control variables are described in the main text. Department
fixed effects are included in all specifications except the first. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. *, **
and *** denote rejection of the null hypothesis of the coefficient being equal to 0 at 10%, 5% and 1% significance level,
respectively.
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Table 7: Neighbor pair fixed effect estimates
Dependent variable: maf c
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sulfur .0206∗∗∗ .0172∗∗ .0231∗∗ .0216∗∗ .0196∗∗ .0207∗∗∗
(.0061) (.0073) (.0093) (.0094) (.0094) (.0055)
Controls
Department FEs N Y Y Y Y Y
Suitability and water N N Y Y Y Y
Geomorphological N N N Y Y Y
Distances N N N N Y Y
Sociodemographic N N N N N Y
Obs. 162 162 162 162 162 162
R2 0.054 0.637 0.667 0.672 0.681 0.795
Note: This table presents the results of OLS estimates for Sicilian municipalities for which values for all the variables are
available. Observations are all those municipalities that form a couple in which a municipality has sulfur and its neighbor
has not. Each municipality in a pair shares a common pair fixed effect. The dependent variable is maf c, the level of mafia
activity at the end of XIX century as coded by Cutrera (1900) on a 0 to 3 scale (0 is no mafia activity, 3 is large mafia
activity). The main explanatory variable Sulfur is the number of sulfur mines as collected by Squarzina (1963), while
the other control variables are described in the main text. Pair fixed effects are included in all specifications. Robust
standard errors are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote rejection of the null hypothesis of the coefficient being
equal to 0 at 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively.
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Table 9: Persistence
Council Real estates Firms Theft Burglary Car theft Robbery
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
maf c .0706∗∗∗ .1477∗∗∗ .1524∗∗∗ -183.9049∗∗∗ 3.1591 -28.3848∗∗∗ -2.2930
(.0187) (.0325) (.0277) (52.9439) (10.1428) (9.4874) (2.0695)
Obs. 282 282 282 282 282 282 282
Note: This table present the result of instrumental variable estimates in which the first stage is specification presented
in column 2 of table 2 (i.e. maf c regressed on sulfur and department fixed effects) and the second stage is a measure
of crime today on the instrumented measure of historical mafia (i.e., maf c). Today mafia presence is measured by: (i)
dissolution of municipal administration due to mafia infiltrations; (ii) seized firms and (iii) seized real estate properties.
Council is a dummy that takes value one whether the municipality council dissolved due to mafia infiltration over the
period 1991 to 2011 (source: Ministero dell’Interno), Real estates is a dummy equals to one whether at least a real
estate property has been seized by the Italian judicial authority and Firms is a dummy equals to 1 whether at least a
firm has been seized (source: Agenzia del Demanio). Theft, Burglary, Car theft and Robbery are crime rates per 100,000
inhabitants for each Sicilian municipality (source: Polizia di Stato, Ministero dell’Interno). Robust standard errors are
presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote rejection of the null hypothesis of the coefficient being equal to 0 at 10%,
5% and 1% significance level, respectively.
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